Unit 42 details PEERSTITCH, a memory-only FortiGate implant
Unit 42 says CL-STA-0954 (Mandiant: UNC5820) chained FortiJump and CVE-2025-61624 to deploy PEERSTITCH, a disk-less ARM64 FortiOS implant, against a telecom MSP.
Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 has detailed PEERSTITCH, a previously unreported, memory-resident implant planted on FortiGate devices after attackers chained two Fortinet flaws. Initial access came through CVE-2024-47575 (FortiJump) against a FortiManager appliance; privilege escalation used CVE-2025-61624, a FortiOS path-traversal flaw, to deploy the implant. Both are patched. If you run FortiManager or FortiOS and haven't applied the April 2026 fixes, do that today — and hunt, because this implant leaves almost nothing on disk.
The primary source is Unit 42's report, Unit 42 Uncovers PEERSTITCH, a Stealthy FortiGate Implant. Secondary coverage is at The Hacker News.
The chain
Unit 42 investigated a multi-stage intrusion at a telecommunications managed service provider. The actor first compromised a centralized FortiManager appliance via FortiJump (CVE-2024-47575), then pulled an archive covering 500+ managed FortiGate firewalls — running configurations, cryptographic material and database files. From there it used CVE-2025-61624, a path traversal in the command-line interpreter of FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy and FortiSwitchManager that allows crafted arguments to write or delete arbitrary files, to stage PEERSTITCH.
PEERSTITCH is a 64-bit Linux ARM64 in-memory implant written in C. Per Unit 42 it leaves no persistent binary on disk, opens no listening ports and makes no outbound connections — it rides traffic from legitimate FortiOS processes instead, which is what makes network and file-based detection unreliable.
CVSS and patch
Fortinet rates CVE-2025-61624 5.4 and fixed it on April 14, 2026 in advisory FG-IR-26-122. The NVD entry scores it higher, 6.5 — note the discrepancy when you prioritize. CVE-2024-47575 (FortiJump) has been a KEV-listed, actively exploited FortiManager bug since late 2024.
Attribution
Unit 42 tracks the intrusion as CL-STA-0954, which Google's Mandiant tracks as UNC5820. Unit 42 says the post-exploitation tradecraft overlaps with activity attributed to suspected nation-state actors, and The Hacker News characterizes the operator as a "suspected advanced threat actor." No country is named in the reporting — keep the attribution at the cluster level.
Indicators
Unit 42 published host and network indicators; a representative subset, as relayed by The Hacker News:
Download server: 23.240.77[.]233:8085
Dropped files: pM.js; a.js (saved as index.js); a.wasm (saved as index.wasm);
b.js (saved as ipssem.js); dd (saved as lldprx)
Targeted daemons: /bin/miglogd, /bin/iked
Hook markers: TCP port 8550, IP 169.254.0.1
Pull the full IOC set from the Unit 42 report rather than this excerpt.
Action checklist
- Patch FortiManager and FortiOS now if you haven't. Apply CVE-2024-47575 (if any appliance is still unpatched) and the FG-IR-26-122 fix for CVE-2025-61624.
- Assume config compromise on FortiManager-managed fleets. If a FortiManager was exposed, rotate credentials and cryptographic material across all managed FortiGates — the attacker's archive in this case covered 500+ devices.
- Hunt on-device, not just on the wire. Check for the daemons and markers above and inspect
/bin/miglogdand/bin/ikedbehavior; a memory-only implant won't show in a file scan or a netflow review.
Context
This is more FortiJump fallout. CVE-2024-47575 has been exploited since 2024 to loot FortiManager-managed fleets; PEERSTITCH shows the same access being parlayed into a stealth implant that survives on tradecraft rather than persistence. If a FortiManager was ever internet-reachable in your estate, the breach you need to rule out is the config theft, not just the current patch level.