Check Point gateways wiped via PHP2Shell, TSGA backdoor, ESXi
Attackers chained PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618/109619) with a Gaia privesc to plant the TSGA backdoor on Check Point gateways and run the destroy_v6 wiper on ESXi hosts.
Attackers chained the PHP2Shell flaws into Check Point Security Gateways, escalated to root, planted a backdoor called TSGA, and in a first wave against Israeli organizations pivoted to VMware ESXi hosts and ran a destructive wiper. Check Point Research documented the campaign; it is reported by BleepingComputer and The Hacker News. This is no longer a scanning story — it ends in data destruction on self-hosted hypervisors.
The chain
- Initial access through a gateway's internet-facing Mobile Access portal using PHP2Shell — CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, unauthenticated RCE that PHP patched on October 21 and CISA added to KEV on October 26.
- Privilege escalation to root via CVE-2026-123039, a missing-authorization flaw in Gaia OS DynamicCLI (CVSS 7.8), addressed in Check Point's November Jumbo Hotfix.
- Persistence: PHP webshells plus the TSGA backdoor, deployed as
slot_CPconfigdaemon, with an embedded TSProxy component that hides operator commands inside normal traffic. - Lateral movement to ESXi hosts located with the open-source
gogoscanner, then the destroy_v6 wiper, which recursively deletes directory contents (zero-fill, with a fast mode that skips overwriting).
In each processed directory the operators drop a note named DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt referencing "Dream Security Ltd." and carrying political messaging — which Check Point flags as a possible false-flag signal.
Exploitation status
Confirmed and destructive. Amazon Threat Intelligence observed PHP2Shell exploitation attempts from around October 17, four days before the patch. The gateway campaign began October 30 against Israeli organizations, with a broader follow-up wave on November 2 that hit companies in multiple countries — the second wave without the wiper stage.
Attribution — hedge it
Check Point tentatively linked the TSGA and TSProxy tooling to PhiliKit, a framework ESET associated with the China-nexus cluster UNC5221 (also tracked as Armory Castle), but said it lacks enough evidence to attribute this campaign to that actor or any other. The political messaging in the wiper note muddies the picture further. Treat "China-nexus" as a lead, not a conclusion.
Detection
Check Point and BleepingComputer list host-level indicators (no YARA or Sigma shipped). Verbatim:
- Session files containing "upload_progress_pwn"
- Unexpected CPconfigdaemon processes or binaries
- Unexplained gaps in firewall logs
- Unauthorized SSH activity from the gateway to internal ESXi hosts
- Source IP against Israeli orgs (late Oct): 130.94.19[.]204
Action checklist
- Install the November Jumbo Hotfix on all Management Servers and Security Gateways, prioritizing any with an internet-facing Mobile Access portal.
- Hunt the indicators above on every gateway that was exposed before patching — a current patch does not clear a prior compromise.
- Check internal ESXi hosts reachable from the gateway for unauthorized SSH, the
gogoscanner, andDREAM_ANNEXATION.txt; isolate and rebuild any wiped host from backup. - Rotate credentials and keys stored on or reachable from the gateway.
Context
PHP2Shell has run the full arc in a month: we covered it exploited in the wild in late October. The new element is the payload — edge-device RCE that terminates in a hypervisor wiper rather than a webshell. Internet-facing security appliances remain the softest path to the rest of the estate, and "destructive" is now on the menu for this bug.